Access to Financing and Firm Growth: Evidence from Ethiopia by Regasa, Dereje et al.




 University of Otago 
 Economics Discussion Papers 
 No. 1707 
 





Access to Financing and Firm Growth: Evidence from 
Ethiopia 
 
DEREJE REGASA,* DAVID FIELDING† & HELEN ROBERTS* 
* Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Otago, Dunedin, NZ 







Address for correspondence: 
David Fielding  
Department of Economics 
University of Otago 









Access to Financing and Firm Growth: Evidence from Ethiopia 
 
DEREJE REGASA,* DAVID FIELDING† & HELEN ROBERTS* 
* Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Otago, Dunedin, NZ 
† Department of Economics, University of Otago, Dunedin, NZ 




ABSTRACT Using Ethiopian firm-level data, we model the effect of different types of 
financing on firm growth. The form of financing is potentially endogenous to firm growth, 
and one contribution of this paper is to introduce a new instrumental variable which 
captures local variation in financial depth. Unlike previous studies of firms in low-income 
countries, we find evidence for a negative relationship between the use of external finance 
and firm growth, which suggests that there are substantial cross-country differences in 
the finance-growth nexus. We discuss possible explanations for this phenomenon and its 
implications for development policy. 
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The microeconomic literature on the links between access to finance and firm growth has 
produced a number of contrasting results. On the one hand, there is evidence from some 
countries that firms with access to external finance grow more quickly (Ayyagari et al., 2010; 
Girma and Vencappa, 2015; Moore et al., 2005; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). This is consistent 
with evidence that for just some firms – those without access to external finance – growth is 
constrained by the size of internal funds (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Rahaman, 2011; 
Guariglia et al., 2011; Chen and Guariglia, 2013), and suggests some form of informational 
asymmetry and/or credit rationing that leads to a violation of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. 
However, some developing countries studies have found no relationship between access to 
external funds and firm growth: see for example Allen et al. (2012) and Beck et al. (2015). One 
possible explanation for this finding is that in countries with weak regulation of financial 
institutions, external finance is allocated to politically well-connected firms with a low marginal 
return to capital. Such an explanation is consistent with macroeconomic evidence that the link 
between financial depth and economic growth has been very weak in recent times (Rousseau and 
Wachtel, 2011), and that financial reforms will benefit growth only in the presence of good 
banking sector regulation (Demetriades and Rousseau, 2016). 
 Our contribution to the literature is to model the determinants of manufacturing firm 
growth in Ethiopia, a developing country which has relatively developed market institutions and 
has experienced high overall economic growth, but also performs poorly on aggregate measures 
of financial depth. Other parts of Africa enjoy more financial depth, but their economic growth is 
still low by international standards, and manufacturing production is constrained by poor 
infrastructure and weak property rights. These differences suggest that Ethiopia is a country in 
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which the quality of infrastructure and property rights are less likely to be binding constraints on 
investment and growth, but access to finance is more likely to be a constraint, so in Ethiopia 
there should be a particularly strong positive relationship between finance and growth. However, 
our results do not support this conjecture: we find strong evidence for a negative relationship 
between access to external finance for working capital and firm growth, and some evidence for a 
similar effect with regard to fixed capital. These results are robust to a variety of different 
estimation methods, including an Instrumental Variables estimator that exploits local variation in 
financial depth as an instrument for access to external finance. We suggest that one explanation 
for our results is that the Ethiopian financial system is still dominated by state-owned banks, and 
this system does not allocate credit to the firms with the highest rate of return to capital. In this 
sense, our microeconomic results are consistent with the macroeconomic results of Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2011) and Demetriades and Rousseau (2016). Access to credit will not be growth-
enhancing while credit markets continue to suffer from systematic allocative inefficiency. We 
also note that these results for Ethiopia are very different from results for other parts of Africa 
(Ojah et al., 2010; Kiendrebeogo and Minea, 2016) and low-income countries elsewhere in the 
world (Ganesh-Kumar et al., 2001). This suggests a degree of institutional heterogeneity which 
should make us interpret the results of cross-country studies of finance and growth with some 
caution. 
 Section II discusses the Ethiopian context in more detail, section III presents our data 
analysis, and section IV concludes. 
 
II. The Ethiopian Economy and Financial System 
Over 2006-2015, the annual average growth rate of Ethiopian real per capita GDP was 7.6%, 
compared with an average of 2.0% for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2016a). 
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The rapid expansion of the Ethiopian economy has been accompanied by a certain amount of 
industrialization. The economy is still dominated by agriculture, which accounts for about 45% 
of GDP, 80% of employment and 85% exports, but real annual manufacturing value added 
growth over the last decade (10.1%) has outstripped total real annual GDP growth (8.9%).1 The 
ratio of gross fixed capital formation to value added in manufacturing is about 38% (Central 
Statistical Agency of Ethiopia, 2011), compared with a figure of about 32% for the whole 
economy (World Bank, 2016a). 
Ethiopia’s high rate of manufacturing sector growth reflects a business environment 
which is relatively favorable: the most recent Doing Business survey scores Ethiopia at 58% for 
the quality of contract enforcement, 59% for access to electricity and 69% for the quality of the 
tax system; this compares with average figures of 47%, 47% and 58% for the rest of Sub-
Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2016b). However, Ethiopia performs more poorly regarding access 
to credit, with a score of 15%; the average score for the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is 36%. Table 
1 provides more detail about credit constraints in Ethiopia compared with those in the rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For each country, the table shows the proportion of firms financing (i) their 
working capital and (ii) their fixed capital entirely from internal funds; data are taken from recent 
rounds of the World Bank’s World Enterprise Survey (www.enterprisesurveys.org). 
Approximately two thirds of Ethiopian firms are constrained in this way, while the figure for 
most other Sub-Saharan African countries is below one half. This difference may reflect a lack of 
competition in the Ethiopian banking system, which is still dominated by state-owned banks 
(Bezabeh and Desta, 2014). In 2014/5 state-owned banks accounted for 65% of all bank credit, 
42% of all bank branches and 51% of all branches outside of the capital city (National Bank of 
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Ethiopia, 2015). Ethiopia has only 29 bank branches per million people, compared with a Sub-
Saharan average of 39 (World Bank, 2015a). 
There may be some advantages in having some banks under state ownership; for 
example, the lending behavior of state-owned banks may be less sensitive to business-cycle 
effects (Bertay et al., 2015). However, the international survey by Megginson (2005) indicates 
that state-owned banks are relatively inefficient, in part because state ownership is associated 
with a greater risk of loan default, suggesting that these banks are more likely to lend to firms 
with low rates of return to capital. Moreover, there is international evidence that a more 
competitive banking sector alleviates credit constraints (Leon, 2015), and that competition from 
foreign banks improves the efficiency of loan allocation (Taboada, 2011). There is relatively 
little evidence specific to Ethiopia, but results reported by Tehulu and Olana (2014) indicate that 
in Ethiopia state ownership is associated with a significantly higher loan default rate. Given the 
dominance of state banks in the Ethiopian banking system, the fact that for 25 years Ethiopia has 
been governed by the same political party (the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic 
Front), the restrictions on foreign investment in financial services (Golub, 2009) and the small 
number of bank branches, there is reason to suspect that the system is highly monopolistic and 
may allocate loans on the basis of a firm’s political connectedness rather than its marginal return 
to capital. In this case, we should not necessarily expect to see a positive relationship between 
access to external finance and firm performance. 
 
III. Modeling Access to Finance and Firm Growth in Ethiopia  
Data 
Our results are based on data from the Ethiopian Enterprise Survey 
(http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2577/study-description), which forms part of 
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the World Enterprise Survey. This survey is not a panel, but it contains a total of 1,492 
observations from firms surveyed in 2011 and 2015 (with a few missing observations for some 
variables for some firms). The survey comprises a sample of firms stratified by industry (textiles, 
garments, leather goods, wood, paper, plastics and rubber, furniture, electronics, chemicals, hotel 
and restaurant services, wholesale trade, retail trade, transport services, information technology 
services and motor vehicle services), size (5-19 employees, 20-99 employees and over 100 
employees), and region. The regions are Addis Ababa (919 observations), Amhara (112 
observations), Dire-Dawa (27 observations), Oromia (219 observations), the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples’ Region (71 observations), and Tigray (144 observations). The survey 
includes responses to questions about access to finance, sales, employment, corruption, 
infrastructure, crime, competition, and obstacles to growth. Following Ayyagari et al. (2010), 
Rahaman (2011) and Beck et al. (2015), the sales and employment data are used to construct the 
following alternative measures of firm growth. 
 
 sales-growthi is the logarithm of the ratio of reported sales by firm i for the current period to 
sales reported for three years ago. 
 
 empl-growthi is the logarithm of the ratio of reported employment by firm i for the current 
period to reported employment for three years ago. 
 
The coefficient of correlation between sales-growthi and empl-growthi is 0.26; this is 
significantly different from both zero and one (p < 0.05), so sales growth and employment 
growth represent connected but distinct measures of changes in firm size. Descriptive statistics 
for these two alternative dependent variables, which are approximately normally distributed, 
appear in Table 2.2  
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Our explanatory variables are constructed mainly from other information in the 
Enterprise Survey. The variables measuring access to finance are as follows. 
 
 wc-externali is the proportion of the firm’s working capital financed from external sources. 
This figure is based on responses to the question asking for an ‘estimate [of] the proportion of 
this establishment’s working capital that was financed through the following sources…’ The 
alternative sources are ‘internal funds / retained earnings,’ ‘banks’ (privately owned and state-
owned), ‘non-bank financial institutions’, ‘credit / advances from suppliers / customers’ and 
‘other’; see World Bank (2015b, page 21). Our explanatory variable is the figure reported for all 
categories except internal funds and retained earnings. 
 
 fc-externali is the proportion of the firm’s fixed capital financed from external sources. This 
measure is based on responses to a survey question with wording analogous to the one for 
working capital. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the two explanatory variables appear in Table 2, with corresponding 
histograms in Figure 1. These histograms are highly skewed: wc-externali = 0 for 69% of the 
firms and fc-externali = 0 for 54% of the firms.3 It may be that whether there is any external 
funding of investment at all is a better measure of access to external finance than the proportions 
wc-externali and fc-externali. For this reason, we will also present results using the indicator 
variables I(wc-externali > 0) and I(fc-externali > 0) as alternative measures of access to external 
finance. Note that wc-externali and fc-externali are quite highly correlated (ρ = 0.31); given this 
collinearity, we will fit alternative models of firm growth incorporating either one or other of the 
financing variables, but not both.  
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In estimating effect of access to external finance on firm growth we will need to control 
for a range of firm characteristics that could be correlated with both firm growth and access to 
finance. These characteristics are as follows; descriptive statistics appear in Table 2. 
 
 firm-sizei is the initial number of employees in firm i (in thousands). Smaller firms may have 
more potential for growth, but their access to external finance may also be more constrained: see 
for example Rahaman (2011), Du and Girma (2012), and Kim et al. (2016). 
 
 firm-agei is the age of the firm i (in tens of years), constructed by subtracting the reported year 
of establishment from the survey year. There is some evidence in the existing literature that 
younger firms grow more quickly; see for example Jovanovic (1982), Coad et al. (2014) and 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013). They may also find it more difficult to secure external finance. 
 
 experiencei is the number of years of experience of firm i’s senior manager, export-sharei is the 
percentage of sales accounted for by exports and profit-margini is the ratio of after-tax profits to 
total asset value; innovationi equals one if firm i claims to have recently introduced new or 
significantly improved product or service and otherwise equals zero. All of these characteristics 
could be associated with higher productivity and a greater growth potential: see Goedhuys and 
Veugelers (2012), Gebreyesus (2009) and Coad and Rao (2008) on innovation, Jang and Park 
(2011) on profitability and Minondo (2014) on exports. These characteristics could also be 
associated with easier access to external finance. 
  
 domestic-owni is an indicator variable which equals one if at least 50% of firm i is in private 
domestic ownership and equals zero otherwise; foreign-owni is an analogous indicator variable 
for private foreign ownership. Firms in private domestic ownership may find it especially 
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difficult to access external finance while state-owned firms find it especially easy, but ownership 
may also be correlated with entrepreneurial capacity and growth potential. 
 
 manufacturingi equals one if firm i operates in the manufacturing sector (textiles, garments, 
leather goods, wood, paper, plastics and rubber, furniture, electronics or chemicals) and 
otherwise equals zero; retaili equals one if firm i operates in retail trade and equals zero 
otherwise. The omitted categories are restaurant services, wholesale trade, transport services, 
information technology services and motor vehicle services. Further sectoral disaggregation does 
not produce any statistically significant effects. 
 
 competitioni equals one if firm i competes against unregistered or informal firms and otherwise 
equals zero. Informal sector competition could hinder the growth of the formal sector firms in 
our sample, since the informal firms face lower compliance costs (Distinguin et al., 2016; Wang, 
2016). However, informal sector firms are unlikely to have access to external finance, so formal 
sector firms producing similar products may face less competition for external finance. 
 
 power-lossi is the reported percentage of annual sales loss due to electricity outages, 
corruptioni is the percentage lost in informal payments to government officials, and regulationi is 
the percentage of time managers spend dealing with government regulations.  
 
All of the variables above are constructed from responses in the Ethiopian Enterprise Survey. 
However, we also need to control for the size of the firm’s local market, which could affect its 
growth potential and also be correlated with the instrument for access to finance described 
below, which is a measure of the number of local banks able to offer a loan. Our proxy for local 
market size is based on data from the 2011 Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey (Central 
Statistical Agency of Ethiopia / ICF International, 2012). This stratified survey includes 
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questions about the physical assets owned by each household living at each sample point, 
including ownership of a refrigerator, a bicycle, a radio, a television, a motorcycle and a car. It 
also includes a question about access to electricity and about the materials from which the house 
is constructed. Responses to these questions form a set of indicator variables which can be 
aggregated by taking the first principal component across the whole sample. The resulting wealth 
index has been shown to be a good proxy for household income (Ucar, 2015; Filmer and 
Pritchett, 2001). Denoting the index value for the jth household as ,jwealth we construct an 
average wealth index for each sample point k as ,/k j kj kwealth wealth N∈= ∑  where kN  is the 
number of households in the sample point. Each firm is identified as operating in a particular 
town (there are 42 towns), and we construct an average wealth index for town h as
,/
∈
= ∑h k hk hwealth wealth M where hM  is the number of sample points associated with the 
town. Sample points are matched to towns using the reported latitude and longitude of each 
point: for large towns all sample points within a 20km radius of the town centroid are used, and 
for small towns all sample points within a 5km radius. Finally, the size of the town’s economy is 
measured as ,⋅h hp wealth  where hp  is the town’s total population as reported in the 2007 census. 
In our model, the variable economy-sizei is equal to the value of ⋅h hp wealth  for the town in which 
firm i is located, scaled so that the minimum value is zero and the maximum value is one. 
 
Estimation strategy 
We have two measures of firm growth (xi ∈ {sales-growthi, empl-growthi}) and two measures of 
access to finance (yi ∈ {wc-externali, fc-externali}). For each x and for each y (i.e. four equations 
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i xy i xy ipx y z uβ ϕ= ⋅ + ⋅ +∑                (1) 
 
Here, piz  indicates the value of the p
th control variable (firm-sizei, firm-agei, experiencei, export-
sharei, profit-margini, innovationi, domestic-owni, foreign-owni, competitioni, power-lossi, 
regulationi, corruptioni, economy-sizei), the β and ϕ terms are parameters to be estimated, and 
xy
iu  is a residual.  
The Ordinary Least Squares estimates may be biased if yi is endogenous to xi (for 
example, if there is unobserved heterogeneity across firms that is correlated with both growth 
performance and access to finance), so we report a second set of estimates fitted using an 
Instrumental Variables estimator. Our choice of instrumental variable is informed by the idea 
that a greater physical distance between borrower and creditor can impair access to finance 
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002), so access to finance depends on the local density of banking 
services. In towns with more bank branches, firms will have more choice of creditor, the local 
financial market will be less monopolistic and banks will have less incentive to restrict the 
supply of credit. The variable bank-branchesi is the number of different banks branches in the 
town in which firm i is located (measured in tens of branches).4 This variable is constructed from 
data collected by one of the authors using information provided by each individual bank; further 
details are available on request. Our model is identified by the exclusion restriction that the 
number of branches has no direct effect on firm growth. The number of branches may be 
correlated with the size of the local economy, and the size of the local economy with firm 
growth, but our variable economy-sizei controls for this effect.5 Recalling that 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1, our 
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first-stage model of yi is fitted using the Fractional Logit estimator of Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996):6 
 
( )- yip pi y i y ipy bank branches z va θ= Λ ⋅ + ⋅ +∑              (2) 
 
Here, Λ(.) is the logistic function, the a and θ terms are parameters to be estimated, and yiv  is a 
residual. In our second-stage model of xi, yi in equation (1) is replaced by ˆ iy  and the standard 
errors for each parameter estimate are computed using a bootstrap. 
 Noting the skewness of the distributions in Figure 1, we report a third set of results in 
which the continuous variable yi is replaced by the indicator variable I(yi > 0). This indicator 
variable might also be endogenous to xi, so these results incorporate a Heckman correction with 
first-stage Probit model of the following form: 
 
( ) ( )P -0 δ η> = Φ ⋅ + ⋅∑ p pi y i y ipy bank branches z              (3) 
 
Here, Φ(.) is the cumulative normal density function and the δ and η terms are parameters to be 
estimated. In our second-stage model of xi, the Inverse Mills Ratio from equation (3), designated 
λi, is added to the right hand side of equation (1) and the standard errors for each parameter 
estimate are computed using a bootstrap. 
 
Results 
Our baseline Ordinary Least Squares estimates of the parameters in equation (1) are presented in 
Table 3. It can be seen that several of our control variables have a significant impact on firm 
growth. As anticipated, there is faster sales and employment growth among younger firms and 
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firms which have innovated. An extra ten years of age reduces sales and employment growth 
over the three-year period by about one percentage point; innovation raises sales growth by about 
15 percentage points and employment growth by about 12. Firms grow faster in towns with a 
larger economy; economy-sizei is an index measure, so to interpret the size of the effect we refer 
to the sample standard deviation of this variable reported in Table 2, which is about 0.5. The 
Table 3 parameter estimates of 0.04-0.05 imply that a two standard deviation increase in 
economy-size raises growth by four or five percentage points. However, the effect is much more 
precisely estimated for employment growth than for sales growth, so only the employment effect 
is statistically significant. Also, firms in the retail trade sector experience significantly slower 
sales growth – the difference is about 12 percentage points – although this is not accompanied by 
lower employment growth, implying a relative decline in labor productivity in this sector. 
Managerial experience significantly reduces employment growth – each year of experience 
lowering growth by about 0.3 percentage points – but without any corresponding sales effect, so 
experience is associated with growth in labor productivity but not in output. 
Conditional on these effects, external funding of capital is associated with lower growth, 
although this effect is significant at the 5% level only for employment growth and working 
capital: here the parameter estimate implies that a firm financing its capital entirely from external 
sources has about 6% less growth over the three-year period than a firm financing its capital 
entirely from internal sources. The sales growth effects are significant at the 10% level, the 
parameter estimates implying that a firm financing its working capital or fixed capital entirely 
from external sources has 9-10% less growth over the three-year period than a firm financing its 
capital entirely from internal sources. However, these estimates might be biased because access 
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to external finance is endogenous to growth, so we need to model wc-externali and fc-externali 
explicitly. 
Table 4 presents estimates of the parameters in equation (2) – the model of wc-externali 
and fc-externali – along with marginal effects indicating the average impact of a unit increase in 
each explanatory variable on the share of capital financed internally. The t-ratios are based on 
bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the town level. The table shows that a number of our 
control variables have a significant impact on the external financing share, with similar effects 
for working capital and fixed capital. Firms with more experienced managers are less reliant on 
internal financing, an extra year of experience increasing the external financing share by about 
0.2 percentage points. Export-intensive firms are also less reliant on internal financing, a one 
percentage point increase in the share of exports in total sales increasing the external financing 
share by about 0.1 percentage points. A two standard deviation increase in the size of the local 
economy (an increase of about one unit: see above) increases the external financing share by 
about 15 percentage points. Conditional on these effects, and as anticipated, the number of bank 
branches in a town has a significantly positive effect on the firm’s access to external financing. 
An extra ten branches in a town increases the external financing share for working capital by 
about a little under two percentage points and the share for fixed capital by a little over two 
percentage points. 
Table 5 presents estimates of the determinants of firm growth using the fitted values for 
wc-externali and fc-externali in place of the observed values, along with t-ratios computed from 
bootstrapped standard errors to allow for the fact that these fitted values are generated regressors. 
Two sets of results are reported: in the first set of results the second-stage models of firm growth 
are fitted by Least Squares, while in the second the models are fitted using a Random Effects 
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estimator that allows for unobserved heterogeneity at the town level. There are eight sets of 
parameter estimates in total: two estimators × two dependent variables (sales-growthi and empl-
growthi) × two measures of access to finance (wc-externali and fc-externali). 
Table 5 shows that the choice of estimator and the choice of the measure of access to 
finance do not make an enormous difference to the results, though there are some differences in 
the precision of parameter estimates. Most of the significant control variable effects in Table 3 
(the effects of firm age, managerial experience, and innovation) are also significant in Table 5, 
and there is little difference in the sizes of these effects. However, other significant effects in 
Table 3 (the effects of retail trade and economy size) are insignificant or only marginally 
significant in Table 5. Estimates of the parameters on wc-externali and fc-externali are slightly 
larger than in Table 3 but this difference is statistically insignificant. The parameters on wc-
externali are significant at the 5% level in three out of four cases and significant at the 10% level 
in the other: a firm relying entirely on external financing for its working capital is predicted to 
have a sales and employment growth rate that is about 12-14 percentage points lower than that of 
a firm relying entirely on internal finance. The parameters on fc-externali are significant at the 
10% level in the two sets of estimates for sales growth but not in the two sets of estimates for 
employment growth. Thus Table 5 produces quite strong evidence for a negative relationship 
between external finance for working capital and firm growth, but weaker evidence for a 
negative relationship between external finance for fixed capital and firm growth. 
 Finally, we present results in which the continuous variables wc-externali and fc-externali 
are replaced by the indicator variables I(wc-externali > 0) and I(fc-externali > 0). As noted above, 
these results are based on a Heckman correction to allow for the potential endogeneity of the 
indicator variables. Parameter estimates in the first-stage model – equation (3) above – are quite 
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similar to the first-stage results in Table 4 and are available on request. Table 6 reports the 
second-stage results, plus estimates of the δ parameter in equation (3). 
The estimated sizes of the parameters on the control variables in Table 6 are very similar 
to those in Table 3, but some of the t-ratios are slightly larger in Table 6 so there are a few more 
statistically significant effects. In particular, there is a firm size effect in the employment growth 
equation that is significant at the 1% level, an extra thousand employees being associated with a 
growth rate that is about 20 percentage points lower. The I(wc-externali > 0) parameters are 
significant at the 1% level in both the sales growth equation and the employment growth 
equation. A firm financing its working capital partly from external funds is predicted to have a 
sales growth rate that is about five percentage points lower than other firms, and an employment 
growth rate that is about two percentage points lower. The I(fc-externali > 0) parameter in the 
sales growth equation is significant at the 5% level, while the corresponding parameter in the 
employment growth equation is significant at the 10% level. A firm financing its fixed capital 
partly from external funds is predicted to have a sales growth rate that is about six percentage 
points lower than other firms, and an employment growth rate that is about one percentage point 
lower. It does seem that the indicator variables give a more precise estimate of the effect of 
access to finance on firm growth, and constitute stronger evidence for such an effect. One 
possible explanation for this result is that any access to external finance reflects a firm that has 
good political connections, but politically connected firms have less growth potential, on 
average. Given that our instrumental variable for access to finance is measured at the town level, 
one interpretation of our findings is that certain towns are better politically connected than 
others; these towns have more banks and better access to finance but (holding constant the size 
of the local economy) their firms grow more slowly, on average. 
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IV. Summary and Conclusion 
Using data from recent surveys of Ethiopian firms, we estimate the effect of a firm’s access to 
finance on the growth of its sales and employment. Access to finance is measured by the 
proportion of its working capital (or fixed capital) funded from internal sources, or alternatively 
by a binary variable indicating whether all of its capital is funded from internal sources. We find 
a significant positive relationship between internal financing and growth: that is, firms with 
access to external finance grow more slowly. These effects are robust to estimation techniques 
that allow for the potential endogeneity of access to finance, using a town-specific measure of 
financial depth as an instrumental variable. 
 These results have stark implications for policies intended to enhance economic growth 
in developing countries through greater financial depth. It seems that firms with access to bank 
finance have less growth potential than those which do not, suggesting substantial allocative 
inefficiency in the banking sector. One possible source of inefficiency is that loans are given to 
firms with the best political connections, not those with the best investment opportunities. In the 
absence of institutional reforms designed to ensure that bank finance is allocated to firms with 
the highest return to capital, incentives to promote the expansion of existing banks are unlikely to 












1. See World Bank (2016a); the difference between the 8.9% here and the 7.6% above reflects Ethiopia’s 
high population grow rate. 
2. Table 2 provides sample statistics for all available observations of each variable. Sample sizes in the 
subsequent results tables are slightly smaller, and vary from one table to another, because of different 
missing observations for different variables. 
3. These percentages are the reason for not disaggregating the different sources of external finance in our 
model: there are too few non-zero observations of each finance type to produce robust estimates of their 
effect. In particular, the average firm in the sample finances only 0.7% of its working capital and 0.8% of 
its fixed capital through loans from non-bank financial institutions, so microfinance from non-bank 
institutions is extremely limited. 
4. All firms are in a town with at least one bank. An alternative measure is the number of banks operating 
in a town. Results using the alternative measure are available on request, but this alternative assumes that 
there is no competition between the managers of different branches of the same bank in a town. 
5. If the exclusion restriction is invalid – for example, if our economy-size variable does not completely 
capture the size of the local economy – then our estimates of the β parameter in equation (1) are likely to 
be biased downwards: firms in towns with more bank branches are likely to be operating in a larger 
economy with more growth potential, and these firms are likely to have better access to external finance, 
i.e. a lower value of y. Our estimates of β are all positive, so if anything the results reported below 
underestimate the size of the effect that we claim to have found. 
6. A Fractional Probit estimator produces results very similar to the Fractional Logit results reported 
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Table 1. The proportion of firms financing investment entirely from internal funds 
  




country working capital 
fixed 
capital 
Ghana 36% 25%  Malawi 43% 51% 
Kenya 24% 36%  Rwanda 35% 58% 
Nigeria 23% 43%  Senegal 48% 45% 
Uganda 38% 44%  Tanzania 40% 54% 
Ethiopia 69% 67%  Zambia 46% 69% 
Source: World Bank World Enterprise Survey (www.enterprisesurveys.org). Figures for each country are 





Table 2. Summary statistics 
 observations mean s.d. 
sales-growth 1,036 0.36 0.77 
empl-growth  1,327 0.21 0.38 
wc-external (0-1 scale) 1,474 0.15 0.73 
fc-external (0-1 scale) 1,492 0.28 0.65 
firm-size (thousands of employees) 1,332 0.08 0.27 
firm-age (tens of years) 1,479 1.37 1.20 
experience (years) 1,462 14.1 9.94 
export-share (in %) 1,492 6.05 21.3 
profit-margin (0-1 scale) 1,479 0.14 0.22 
innovation (binary variable) 1,487 0.40 
 domestic-own (binary variable) 1,389 0.93 
 foreign-own (binary variable) 1,389 0.07 
 manufacturing (binary variable) 1,492 0.44 
 retail (binary variable) 1,492 0.24 
 competition (binary variable) 1,396 0.36 
 power-loss (in %) 1,492 5.61 11.5 
regulation (in %) 1,403 6.94 13.5 
corruption (in %) 1,350 0.36 3.81 
economy-size (0-1 scale) 1,492 0.63 0.47 
bank-branches (tens of branches) 1,492 6.58 4.25 





Table 3. Baseline Ordinary Least Squares parameter estimates 
 dependent variable: sales-growth dependent variable: empl-growth 
 coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio 
wc-external -0.093 -1.78 
  
-0.064 -1.98* 
  fc-external 
  
 -0.105 -1.82 
  
-0.072 -1.24 
firm-size -0.004 -0.11 -0.008 -0.20 -0.181 -1.89 -0.179 -1.88 
firm-age -0.013 -3.38** -0.013 -3.38** -0.011 -4.84** -0.011 -4.89** 
experience -0.001 -0.25 -0.001 -0.32 -0.003 -3.12** -0.003 -3.04** 
export-share -0.000 -0.48 -0.001 -0.60 -0.000 -0.09 -0.000 -0.08 
profit-margin 0.010  0.10 0.005  0.04 -0.047 -0.65 -0.043 -0.59 
innovation 0.152  3.36** 0.156  3.45** 0.120  5.33** 0.119  5.30** 
domestic-own 0.220  0.96 0.223  0.97 0.103  1.36 0.094  0.37 
foreign-own 0.332  1.35 0.335  1.36 0.068  0.86 0.060  0.81 
manufacturing -0.001 -0.01 -0.004 -0.06 -0.039 -1.50 -0.037 -1.42 
retail -0.119 -2.07* -0.119 -2.07* -0.029 -1.02 -0.027 -0.96 
competition -0.021 -1.69 -0.021 -1.65 -0.002 -0.43 -0.002 -0.46 
power-loss 0.001  0.21 0.000  0.18 -0.000 -0.38 -0.001 -0.35 
regulation 0.000  0.05 -0.000 -0.05 -0.002 -1.96* -0.002 -1.86 
corruption 0.004  0.49 0.003  0.46 0.003  0.94 0.003  0.86 
economy-size 0.039  0.80 0.039  0.78 0.054  2.25* 0.052  2.17* 
sample size 887 889 1,164 1,175 
T-ratios are computed from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. * indicates a parameter significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level and ** a parameter significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 





Table 4. Fractional logit models of access to finance 
 dependent variable: wc-external dependent variable: fc-external 
 coeff. t-ratio  m.e.  coeff. t-ratio  m.e.  
bank-branches 0.130   4.09** 0.016 
 
0.113   4.38** 0.022  
firm-size 0.079   0.40 0.009 
 
0.194   0.81 0.038  
firm-age -0.006  -0.44 -0.001 
 
-0.001  -0.08 -0.000  
experience 0.024   3.62** 0.003 
 
0.014   2.53* 0.003  
export-share 0.008   2.39* 0.001 
 
0.006   2.46* 0.001  
profit-margin -0.112  -1.29 -0.013 
 
-0.238  -1.62 -0.046  
innovation 0.030   0.24 0.004 
 
0.172   1.61 0.034  
domestic-own -1.453  -0.25 -0.174 
 
-1.439  -0.25 -0.281  
foreign-own 0.416   0.08 0.050 
 
0.421   0.08 0.082  
manufacturing 0.254   1.66 0.030 
 
-0.031  -0.25 -0.006  
retail -0.046  -0.27 -0.005 
 
-0.111  -0.79 -0.022  
competition 0.012   0.38 0.001 
 
-0.031  -1.52 -0.006  
power-loss -0.002  -0.30 -0.000 
 
0.006   1.42 0.001  
regulation -0.014  -3.44** -0.002 
 
-0.004  -1.11 -0.001  
corruption -0.005  -0.20 -0.001 
 
0.013   0.74 0.003  
economy-size 1.330   4.48** 0.159 
 
0.727    2.95** 0.142  
sample size  1,169    1,180   
F-test for joint significance   64.3**      59.4**   
T-ratios are computed from bootstrapped standard errors. * indicates a parameter significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level and ** a parameter significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Sample sizes are 







Table 5. Instrumental Variables parameter estimates 
 Second-Stage Estimator: Least Squares  Second-Stage Estimator: Random Effects 
 dependent variable: sales-growth dependent variable: empl-growth dependent variable: sales-growth dependent variable: empl-growth 
 coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio 
wc-internal -0.144 -1.82   
 
-0.119 -2.38*   
 
-0.134 -2.13*   
 










firm-size 0.013  0.20 0.030  0.40 -0.181 -1.93 -0.167 -1.81 0.013  0.02 0.022  0.23 -0.167 -1.88 -0.176 -1.81 
firm-age -0.014 -3.11** -0.013 -3.07** -0.011 -4.69** -0.011 -4.65** -0.014 -1.69 -0.014 -2.42* -0.011 -4.72** -0.011 -4.49** 
experience 0.002  0.78 0.001  0.48 -0.004 -2.72* -0.004 -2.91** 0.002  0.70 0.002  0.46 -0.004 -2.22* -0.004 -2.74* 
export-share 0.001  0.32 0.002  0.25 -0.009 -0.30 -0.004 -0.28 0.005  0.28 0.002  0.25 -0.009 -0.26 -0.004 -0.27 
profit-margin 0.024  0.15 0.114  0.62 -0.046 -0.53 -0.058 -0.60 0.013  0.06 0.124  0.52 -0.046 -0.48 -0.058 -0.59 
innovation 0.159  3.18** 0.132  2.63* 0.120  5.22** 0.123  5.17** 0.156  2.43* 0.123  2.00* 0.119  5.08** 0.123  4.75** 
domestic-own 0.054  0.07 0.281  0.30 0.116  0.39 0.086  0.29 -0.052 -0.03 0.230  0.15 0.120  0.33 0.086  0.24 
foreign-own 0.162  0.21 0.389  0.41 0.083  0.28 0.053  0.18 0.056  0.03 0.330  0.23 0.083  0.24 0.053  0.15 
manufacturing 0.024  0.33 -0.010 -0.16 -0.040 -1.37 -0.040 -1.35 0.030  0.25 -0.020 -0.24 -0.042 -1.35 -0.040 -1.28 
retail -0.126 -1.92 -0.136 -2.18* -0.030 -0.88 -0.03 -0.84 -0.120 -1.39 -0.130 -1.69 -0.030 -0.90 -0.030 -0.85 
competition -0.020 -1.49 -0.025 -2.00* -0.002 -0.44 -0.002 -0.30 -0.02 -1.32 -0.030 -1.93 -0.002 -0.48 -0.002 -0.30 
power-loss 0.001  0.10 0.001  0.58 -0.001 -0.33 -0.005 -0.44 0.004  0.12 0.002  0.59 -0.004 -0.32 -0.004 -0.47 
regulation 0.002  0.87 0.005  0.33 -0.002 -1.74 -0.002 -1.82 0.002  0.66 0.005  0.30 -0.002 -1.52 -0.002 -1.74 
corruption 0.004  0.29 0.006  0.52 0.003  0.64 0.002  0.54 0.004  0.30 0.007  0.65 0.003  0.65 0.003  0.60 
economy-size 0.010  0.16 0.07  1.21 0.060  2.02* 0.050  2.03* 0.010  0.08 0.060  0.87 0.060  1.66 0.050  1.68 
sample size 887 889 1,164 1,175 887 889 1,164 1,175 
T-ratios are computed from bootstrapped standard errors. * indicates a parameter significantly different from zero at the 5% level and ** a parameter 




Table 6. Parameter estimates using I(wc-external > 0) and I(fc-external > 0) 
 dependent variable: sales-growth dependent variable: empl-growth 
 coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio coeff. t-ratio 
I(wc-external > 0) -0.045 -2.74**   
 
-0.023 -2.98**   





firm-size 0.005  0.06 0.005  0.06 -0.184 -4.69** -0.203 -5.04** 
firm-age -0.012 -2.93** -0.013 -2.98** -0.011 -5.18** -0.011 -4.85** 
experience -0.001 -0.47 -0.001 -0.48 -0.004 -3.10** -0.004 -3.32** 
export-share -0.004 -0.35 -0.004 -0.39 -0.004 -0.09 0.002  0.03 
profit-margin 0.038  0.31 0.028  0.22 -0.047 -0.74 -0.058 -0.89 
innovation 0.150  3.34** 0.157  3.46** 0.119  5.45** 0.140  5.99** 
domestic-own 0.217  0.48 0.218  0.48 0.094  0.37 0.078  0.31 
foreign-own 0.312  0.68 0.313  0.68 0.060  0.23 0.038  0.15 
manufacturing -0.007 -0.14 -0.004 -0.07 -0.039 -1.53 -0.040 -1.48 
retail -0.112 -1.97* -0.109 -1.91 -0.028 -1.01 -0.044 -1.47 
competition -0.020 -1.96* -0.020 -1.94 -0.002 -0.52 0.003  0.57 
power-loss 0.003  0.16 -0.005 -0.02 -0.004 -0.37 -0.002 -1.47 
regulation 0.007  0.05 0.020  0.12 -0.020 -2.28* -0.015 -1.88 
corruption 0.003  0.52 0.003  0.56 0.003  0.90 0.003  1.10 









first-stage coeff.  
on bank-branches 
0.021  2.58* 0.021  2.55* 0.025  2.44* 0.022  2.12* 
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